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Abstract
The most recent financial upheavals have cast doubt on the adequacy of some of
the conventional quantitative risk management strategies, such as VaR (Value at
Risk), in many common situations. Consequently, there has been an increasing
need for verisimilar financial stress testings, namely simulating and analyzing
financial portfolios in extreme, albeit rare scenarios. Unlike conventional risk
management which exploits statistical correlations among financial instruments,
here we focus our analysis on the notion of probabilistic causation, which is
embodied by Suppes-Bayes Causal Networks (SBCNs); SBCNs are probabilistic
graphical models that have many attractive features in terms of more accurate
causal analysis for generating financial stress scenarios.
In this paper, we present a novel approach for conducting stress testing
of financial portfolios based on SBCNs in combination with classical machine
learning classification tools. The resulting method is shown to be capable of
correctly discovering the causal relationships among financial factors that af-
fect the portfolios and thus, simulating stress testing scenarios with a higher
accuracy and lower computational complexity than conventional Monte Carlo
Simulations.
Keywords: Stress Testing, Graphical Models, Causality, Suppes-Bayes Causal
Networks, Classification, Decision Trees
1This is an extended version of the conference paper [1].
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1. Introduction
This paper combines state-of-the-art algorithmic techniques from data sci-
ence, machine learning, causality analysis and financial engineering to expose
risks in financial markets via explicit adversarial scenarios constructed from
historical data. It is more precise than traditional risk analysis via VaR and
computationally more efficient than Monte Carlo simulation-based approaches.
Thus, whereas it has been studied how to identify “factors” that negatively affect
a financial asset (or portfolio) and how they are correlated, algorithms to gener-
ate a causally plausible adverse temporal trajectories of events have remained an
unsurmountable challenge. Monte Carlo simulations using Bayes Network have
found wide-spread use, but they do not produce an explainable framework, nor
do they have attractive computational complexity. Human-expert generated
scenarios can be augmented with rational explanation, but they lack consis-
tency and scalability. Notwithstanding these challenges, risk management has
become a central part of world finance in the past decades as financial regulators
demand more quantitative risk assessments of financial entities. For example,
the Basel Committee under International Bank of Settlements recommends that
all banks maintain a minimum capital reserve.
The proposed quantitative assessments are designed and implemented to
mitigate the risk of insolvency: namely, the depletion of capital of financial
entity to the point that it has to stop its operations. In accounting terms,
for any financial entity, its account consists of assets, liabilities and net equity,
where the famous accounting identity holds: Asset =Liabilities + Net Equity.
The task of quantitative risk management is to calculate the amount of equity
that has to be reserved so that the net equity will not drop to negative when
potential risks materialize into actual losses [2]. In other words, this excess
capital reserve serves as a ‘risk buffer’ that will absorb potential losses and
prevent the financial entity from bankruptcy. Before the catastrophic financial
crisis in 2008, the risk assessments were in general statistical risk measures like
Value-at-Risk [3]. The central idea behind statistical risk measure is: we assess
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the statistical distribution of our portfolio or balance sheet, and estimate the
statistically large adverse moves. If our capital reserve is enough to cover such
losses, then we can safely assume that we are statistically free from insolvancy.
Value-at-Risk is the most widely used measure, which assesses usually the worst
1% loss. Depending on different financial entities, hedge funds, banks or clearing
houses, and on different financial instruments, stocks, bonds, or derivatives in
their balance sheets, the specific methods of calculating such risk measures like
VaR may vary, but generally they can be reasonably estimated by methods like
Monte Carlo Simulation [4].
However, such conventional approaches became discredited when the recent
events led to major financial catastrophes. For example, in the recent 2008
financial crisis, the reserves calculated the risk by using methods such as VaR
which proved to be painfully inadequate. In a recent analysis of VaR before
and during the financial crisis conducted by the Federal Reserve Board, the
average bank profit-and-loss(PnL) did not exceed the bank VaR from December
2003 to April 2007, while the bank average PnL exceeded VaR six times from
June 2007 to March 2008 [5]. In other words, banks which maintained capital
reserves equal to their Value-at-Risk would face on average six near bankruptcies
during the crisis. What most intrigued the economists and political and social
scientists, was the sheer lack of a single plausible causal explanation of these
events – which is thought to have ranged from (i) “One eyed Scottish idiot!
(Jeremy Clarkson); (ii) “Complex financial products; undisclosed conflicts of
interest; the failure of regulators, the credit rating agencies, and the market
itself. [6], Interest Rate Spreads, Emerging Markets: e.g., BRICS – and so on.
Both the unusual abruptness and intuitive implausibility earned such scenarios
the name, “Black Swan Events” – and many more. It also raised the question
whether there is a theory of “causality” that can rigorously explain such events
empirically from data – we suggest that the machinery of model checking for a
suitably expressive logic (e.g., PCTL Probabilistic Computational Tree Logic,
a branching time propositional modal logic) provides just the right capabilities
to succinctly specify and efficiently verify statements about such scenario. It
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derives its power from the way it combines logic, probability and reasoning
about time.
More informally, these approaches could address the deeply-felt need for
better regulation (and intervention) in the form of stress testing. Stress testing
refers to the analysis or simulation of the response of financial instruments or
institutions, given intensely stressed scenarios that may lead to a financial crisis
[7]. For example, narrowly speaking, stress testing may model the response of a
portfolio when Dow Jones suddenly drops by 5%. The difference between stress
testing and conventional risk management is that stress testing deliberately
introduces an adversarial, albeit plausible event, which may be highly improb-
able but not implausible – e.g., afore-mentioned black swan event triggering an
unforeseen scenario. Thus, stress testing must be capable of observing the re-
sponse of financial instruments or institutions under extremely rare scenarios.
Such scenarios must be deemed to be unlikely to be observed in conventional
risk management, where the simpler system may fail to estimate a 99th per-
centile of the loss distribution, and subsequently leading to a claim that, with
99% confidence level, a specific portfolio will perform well, giving a false sense
of security.
1.1. Our Contribution
Our core contribution is a stress testing method built on Suppes’ causality
structure and a novel algorithm to create and traverse Suppes Bayes Causal Net-
works (SBCN). Note that we had originally developed and applied this causality
framework to study cancer progression, but had not explored its combination
with ML (machine Learning), as here, for generating rare adversarial scenarios
for stress testing. The integration of causality analysis with machine learning
results in a novel and practical (albeit approximate) approach to risk analysis
that is currently lacking in data science.
This paper evolves from Rebonato’s use of Bayesian Network [8] as the core
modeling technique, and extends beyond his method to combine the three stress
testing scenario generation methods. Our scenario generation method samples
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from a conditioned Bayesian Network learned from historical data that is able
to capture the causality structure between risk factors and financial assets. The
advantage of this method is that the clear causal structure makes interpretation
of stress testing results more intuitive. The method also incorporates machine
learning tools to identify scenarios that are most detrimental to specific portfo-
lios and reduce the computational complexity of sampling.
Our second contribution is in augmenting traditional factor models with
causality analysis – a challenging area in data science, especially, in finance and
econometrics. For instance, after the 2008 Sub-prime Mortgage Crisis, many
attempts have been taken to explore the causes of the gigantic crisis. Many
attributed the crisis to very ‘direct’ causes – as suggested earlier, they would
include: low-quality mortgage loans whose risk is concealed by securitization;
derivatives like credit-default-swaps which helped support lending. Others pre-
sented more ‘indirect’ causes: banks’ capital requirements by Basel Accord,
which encouraged securitization; long-term record low interest rates encouraged
reckless borrowing. [9] People’s interests in causality have grown tremendously
since the crisis, since it is easier to understand cause and effects, than associ-
ation or correlation, just like in natural sciences. However, causality structure
is more than just cause and effects. In the explanations of the crisis mentioned
above, we can already see the different, ‘direct’ or ‘indirect’ causes convolute
together: capital requirements encouraged securitization and securitization hid
risk; long-term low interest rate encouraged reckless borrowing, which led to
the existence of low-quality mortgages. The past attempts admitted the ‘con-
voluted interactions’ between causes, but failed to explore the actual complex
causality structure. Nevertheless, the true discovery of the causality structure
is crucial not only to the understanding of the interactions between causes and
effects, but also to the generation of sound hypothetical scenarios. The algorith-
mic framework presented here takes us one step closer to understanding various
latent causal structures at play in a complex financial market.
Our final contribution is in providing a practical and scalable implementation
of financial causality analysis building on a theoretical foundation of causality
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with a rich and deep philosophical history. The start of modern causality theory
is Scottish philosopher David Hume’s regularity theory. The core of his theory
is temporal priority, which means that causes always come before their effects,
or in other words, causality follow a pattern of succession in time [10]. Follow-
ing Hume, Judea Pearl’s notion of intervention has laid the foundation of many
modern computer algorithms for causal network inference. Intervention by Pearl
implies that if we manipulate c and nothing happens, then c cannot be cause
of e, but if a manipulation of c leads to a change in e, then we may conclude
that c is a cause of e, although there might be other causes as well [11]. Unre-
latedly, Patrick Suppes proposed his notion of prima facie cause which extends
the ideas of Hume and Pearl, and this paper efficiently automates discovery
of Suppes’ prime facie causation to construct the causal Bayesian network of
financial factors and assets.
To iterate an earlier point, the work presented here builds on our earlier work
on cancer progression, but also addresses many practical challenges – unique to
financial data – where computational efficiency is paramount, but nontrivial.
1.2. Road-map:
This paper is organized as follow. Next section describes the background
and related work. The section, following immediately, addresses theoretical
foundations of our method and, in particular, it shows how combining the ex-
pressivity of Suppes-Bayes Causal Networks together with classical classification
approaches can effectively capture the dynamics of financial stress testing. Sec-
tion 4 provides results describing the accuracy (specificity and sensitivity) of our
algorithm for the efficient inference and traversal of SBCNs from financial data
and discusses its performance in-depth; it shows on realistic simulated data how
our approach is preferable in comparison to the standard Bayesian methods.
Section 5 concludes the paper.
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2. Literature Review
The emerging area of financial stress testing is still an embryonic field and
has a relatively meager literature – traditional data science approaches are not
directly applicable; automation of the manual methods relying on domain ex-
pertise is mostly unformalized.
2.1. Stress Testing Literature in Finance
Before the financial crisis, stress testing only enjoyed interest among ad-
vanced financial practitioners like risk managers and central bankers. Neverthe-
less, the severity of the global financial crisis and its unexpected nature suggested
that a more extensive and rigorous use of stress testing methodologies would be
crucial to reduce the occurrence of similar catastrophes. [12] Stress testing first
emerged as banks’ internal self-assessment of their financial soundness in the
early 1990s. [13] These stress tests were small-scale tests for individual banks
to assess their own trading activities and balance sheets. Later, in 1996, the
Basel I Market Risk Amendment required banks to develop stress tests as part
of their internal models for the calculation of capital requirements for market
risk. [12] In 2004, Basel II introduced requirement for credit risk stress testing
by banks. Most recently, in 2011, the Federal Reserve began Comprehensive
Capital Analysis and Review (CCAR) program which incorporated an annual
bank stress test. [13] The start of CCAR marks a nation-wide implementa-
tion of stress testing as a regular financial stability assessment. Stress testing
thereby became one of the much debated topics in financial regulation and risk
management.
2.2. Stress Testing Literature in Data Science
Recently, many different approaches have been developed to implement stress
testing. In general, a stress testing procedure consists of two steps: (i) genera-
tion of stress scenarios, and (ii) stress projections. The first step generates the
adversarial, albeit plausible stress scenario. The second step projects financial
portfolios or banks’ balance sheets onto the stress scenario and estimates the
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potential loss. In terms of stress scenario generation, the most direct method is
the historical one, in which observed events from the past are used to test con-
temporary portfolios [14]. Some example historical scenarios used by practioners
are: Black-Monday in 1987, Asian Crisis in 1997, and Financial Crisis in 2008.
[13] As an alternative, the event-based method has been proposed in order to
quantify a specific hypothetical stress scenario subjectively, by domain experts,
and then estimate the possible consequence of such event using macroeconomic
and financial models [14]. To ensure a scenario is damaging to the portfolio, a
portfolio-based method has been also studied in order to link scenarios directly
with the portfolio [14]. To this extent, portfolio-based methods rely on Monte
Carlo Simulation to identify the movements of risk factors that stress the given
portfolio most severely.
However, all of these scenario generation methods have their own limitations.
The historical approach is objective since it is based on actual events, but it is
not necessarily relevant under the present conditions. The event-based hypo-
thetical method is more relevant, but it relies intensively on expert judgment
on whether a hypothetical event will be severely-damaging, albeit still plausi-
ble to occur. Sometime such judgment becomes difficult when the relationship
between the underlying risk factors and the portfolio is unknown. Hypothetical
methods have been blamed for their high degree of uncertainty. Practitioners
sometimes find it hard to interpret the result of stress testing on hypotheti-
cal events since the probability of occurrence of the event is uncertain [8], and
the construction of the hypothetical events are subjective. The portfolio-based
method relies heavily on Monte Carlo Simulation, but brute force Monte Carlo
Simulation is computationally inefficient especially when dealing with many risk
factors. Also, portfolio-based methods are difficult to implement for nation-wide
inter-bank stress testing like CCAR.
To solve this problem, Rebonato et al. proposed a sampling approach based
on Bayesian networks in [8], which naturally relied on correlations, but not
causation. Our work, presented here addresses this shortcoming.
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3. Method
The underlying stress testing method builds on several ideas from a diverse
sets of fields: Finance, Machine Learning, Causal Data Science and Algorith-
mics; we discuss these building blocks successively.
3.1. Finance Theory
Traditionally markets are thought to be efficient and follow CAPM (Capital
Asset Pricing Models), which assumes that return of an asset may be defined
as follows:
r = Rf + β1(Km −Rf ) + α, (1)
where r is the return of the asset, Rf the risk free return (usually measured in
terms of government treasury returns) and Km the market factor (measured as
value-weighted market portfolio, similar to stock indexes). Such a model is of
little interest in terms of stress testing of a portfolio of assets as all assets are
equally correlated to the market and are affected similarly by any scenario.
For our purposes, it is more meaningful to assume that the stocks are affected
differently by different econometric factors and are causally intertwined. For
example, we may adopt a common stock factor model, the Fama French Five
Factor Model [15], where the return of the asset is defined as follows:
r = Rf + β1(Km−Rf ) + β2SMB+ β3HML + β4RMW + β3CMA+α. (2)
In the equation,
• r is the return of the asset;
• Rf is the risk free return, usually measured in terms of government trea-
sury returns;
• Km stands for market factor, measured as value-weighted market portfolio,
similar to stock indexes;
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• SMB (Small Minus Big) stands for company size factor, measured by
return on a diversified portfolio of small stocks minus the return on a
diversified portfolio of big stocks;
• HML (High Minus Low) stands for company book-to-market (B/M) ratio
factor, measured by difference between the returns on diversified portfolios
of high and low B/M stocks, where B/M is the ratio between company’s
book value to market value;
• RMW (Robust Minus Weak) stands for company operating profitability
factor, measured by the returns on diversified portfolios of stocks with
robust and weak profitability and
• CMA (Conservative Minus Aggressive) stands for company investment
factor, difference between the returns on diversified portfolios of low and
high investment stocks, called conservative and aggressive [15].
Consequently, the factors may be assumed to evolve temporally following
embedded causal relationships. Their effects on the portfolio of stocks may be
inferred by linearly regressing historical returns r, onto the five factors. How-
ever, we will also need to infer from data the temporal and probability-raising
relations among the pairs of factors, which would indicate potentially genuine
causal relations that affect the dynamics of the financial market. These provide
the key ingredients of the plausible adversarial trajectories.
3.2. Machine Learning Theory
We start with Machine Learning using Bayesian Graphical Models [16], pop-
ularly known as Bayesian networks, as a framework to assess stress testing,
as previously done in this context by [8]. Bayesian networks have long been
used in biological modeling such as -omics data analysis, cancer progression
or genetics [17, 18, 19], but their application to financial data analysis has
been rare. Roughly speaking, Bayesian networks attempt to exploit the condi-
tional independence among random variables, whether the variables represent
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genes or financial instruments. In this paper we adopt a variation of the tradi-
tional Bayesian networks as done in [20, 21], There Mishra and his co-authors
have shown how constraining the search space of valid solutions by means of
a causal theory grounded in Suppes’ notion of probabilistic causation [22] can
be exploited in order to devise better statistical inference algorithms. Also, by
accounting for Suppes’ notion of probabilistic causation, we ensure not only
conditional independence but also prima facie causal relations among variables,
leading us to a better definition of the actual factors leading to risk. Moreover,
through a maximum likelihood optimization scheme which makes use of a reg-
ularization score, we also attempt to only retain edges in the Bayesian network
(graphically depicted as a directed acyclic graph, DAG) that correspond to only
genuine causation, while eliminating all the spurious causes [23].
Yet, given the inferred network, we can sample from it to generate plausible
scenarios, though not necessarily adversarial or rare. In the case of stress testing,
it is crucial to also account for rare configurations, for this reason, we adopt
auxiliary tools from machine learning to discover random configurations that
are both unexpected and undesired.
Here, we expand the concept sketched above, starting with a background
discussion of our framework, by describing the adopted Bayesian models and
causal theories and we then show how classification – proviso an inferred causal
model like SBCN is available – can effectively guide stress testing simulations.
3.2.1. Traditional Bayesian networks
Informally, Bayesian networks are defined as a directed acyclic graph (DAG)
G = (V,E), in which each node ∈ V represents a random variable to which is
associated a conditional probability table, and each arc ∈ E models a binary
dependency relationship. The nodes induce an overall joint distribution that
can be written as a product of the conditional distributions associated with
each variable [16]. In this paper, without any loss of generality, we restrict our
attention to Bernoulli random variables with support in {0, 1}. Specifically, we
will consider as inputs for our analyses a dataset D of m observations over n
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Bernoulli variables; we refer to the next subsections for a detailed description
of the meaning of such variables. More details about Bayesian networks may be
found in [16].
Figure 1: Example of graphical structure of a Bayesian network with 4 random variables.
Let us now consider as an example the Bayesian network shown in Figure
1, where A, B, C, and D are 4 random variables (e.g., an econometric factor’s
value relative to a threshold) represented by four nodes, and the dependencies
among the nodes are modeled by directed arcs. Thus, a pertinent network
could encode certain binary relations, such as correlations or causality, among
Fama French Factors such as Km (market factor, akin to stock indexes), S
(SMB, for company sizes), H (HML,for company book-to-market (B/M) ratio),
R, (RMW, for company operating profitability), and C (CMA, for company
investment factor). The graph is defined by V = {Km, S,H,R,C} and E ⊆
V × V . Loosely speaking, the link A → B indicates that the knowledge
of A (the parent) influences the probability of B (the child), or A and B are
statistically dependent. Furthermore, for node B, node A is called B’s parent
and nodes C and D are called B’s children. More precisely, in the conditional
probability tables related to the afore mentioned Bayesian network, the rows
for node B specifies how the knowledge of A affects the probability of B being
observed. For example, let A and B be both binary random variables with
support over {0, 1}. Table 1 specifies the distribution of B under the condition
of A, and we can see clearly the effect of the parent on the child in this example.
One of the most significant feature of Bayesian network is the notion of con-
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A = 0 A = 1
B = 0 P (B = 0|A = 0) =
0.3
P (B = 0|A = 1) =
0.4
B = 1 P (B = 1|A = 0) =
0.7
P (B = 1|A = 1) =
0.6
Table 1: Example of conditional probability table of node B having node A is unique parent.
ditional independence. Simply speaking, for any node X in a Bayesian network,
given the knowledge of node X’s parents, X is conditionally independent of all
nodes that are not its children, or all its predecessors [16]. For example, in the
Bayesian network in Figure 1, node C is conditionally independent of node A,
when conditioned on node B being fixed. The possibility of exploiting condi-
tional dependencies when computing the induced distribution of the Bayesian
network is a powerful property since it simplifies the conditional probability
table tremendously. For example, the conditional probability table of node C,
will not contain entries P (C|A,B) since P (C|A,B) = P (C|B), or node C is
independent of A conditioned on B: A ⊥ C|B.
In the context of stress testing, Rebonato [8] suggests a subjective approach
to constructing Bayesian networks. After carefully selecting a set of random
variables as the nodes of the network, Rebonato proposes to subjectively connect
the variables and assign the relevant conditional probability tables with the help
of risk managers or other experts. Then with the inferred Bayesian network,
reasoning about stressed events or simulation can be conducted. Please see [8]
for details.
3.2.2. Suppes-Bayes Causal Networks & Our Approach
Our framework builds upon many of Rebonato’s intuitions but exploits our
recent works on causality to address all the key problems, of which the subjec-
tive approach falls short. The subjective approach is handy under the condition
of expert knowledge of the causal relationships of some variables. However, such
reliance becomes unnatural when experts are confronted with random variables
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that are clearly beyond their expertise: for example, the relationship of unem-
ployment and stock market performance, or more simply, the relationship of a
pair of arbitrarily chosen stocks. Therefore, instead of completely abandoning
the role of data in the construction of Bayesian network, here we adopt statis-
tical inference algorithms that can learn both the structure and the conditional
probability table of the Bayesian network from the data, which, in turn, can be
further augmented by expert knowledge if deemed necessary.
Thus, unlike [8], our stress testing approach builds on the foundation of
Suppes-Bayes Causal Networks (SBCNs), which are not only more strictly reg-
ularized than the general Bayesian networks but also enjoys many other attrac-
tive features such as interpretability and refutability. SBCNs exploit the notion
of probabilistic causation, originally proposed by Patrick Suppes [22].
In [22], Suppes described the notion of prima facie causation. A prima facie
causal relation between any event u and its effect v is verified when the following
two conditions hold: (i) temporal priority (TP), i.e., a cause happens before its
effect and (ii) probability raising (PR), i.e., the presence of the cause raises the
probability of observing its effect.
Definition 1 (Probabilistic causation, [22]). For any two events u and v, oc-
curring respectively at times tu and tv, under the mild assumptions that 0 <
P (u), P (v) < 1, the event u is called a prima facie cause of v if it occurs before
and raises the probability of v, i.e.,(TP ) tu < tv(PR) P (v | u) > P (v | u) [also ≡ P (v | u) > P (v).] (3)
where u ≡ ¬u is the Boolean complement of u and corresponds to the event “not
u.” Our reformulation2 follows straightforward logic.
The mathematical underpinnings of Probabilistic Causation are easily ex-
pressible in the logic below, which also allows efficient model checking in general.
2Note that: P (v | u) > P (v | u) ≡ P (v | u)P (u) + P (v | u)(1 − P (u)) > P (v | u)P (u) +
P (v | u)(1− P (u)) ≡ P (v | u) > P (v).
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Thus enumerating complex prima facie causes from data or probabilistic state
transition models becomes feasible. Thus, starting with a discrete time Markov
chain (DTMC)3 – a directed graph with a set of states, S, it is endowed (via
labeling functions) with the atomic propositions true within them. It is possible
to make the labeling probabilistic, so that one may express that “high market
optimism” may be false due to the fact that an adverse election results may be
revealed with some small probability (e.g., depending on the status of a certain
investigation). The states are related pairwise by the transition probability. We
also have an initial state from which we can begin a path (trajectory) through
the system. Each state has at least one transition to itself or another state in
S with a non-zero probability.
A general framework for causality analysis is provided by model checking
algorithms in PCTL (Probabilistic Computational Tree Logic) and has been
explored in details by Mishra and his students [25]. We start with a brief
discussion on how Suppes’ prima-facie causality can be formulated in PCTL, but
then develop an efficient, albeit simplified, approach to financial stress testing
using factor-models and SBCN (with pair-wise causality represented as edges
in a graphical model) – originally introduced by Mishra and his colleagues as
a simplification. See [25, 23, 26] More general, and computationally expensive
(though tractable), approaches using PCTL will be explored in future research.
Definition 2 (Probabilistic Computational Tree Logic, PCTL [27]). The types
of formulas that can be expressed in PCTL are path formulas and state formulas.
State formulas express properties that must hold within a state, determined by
how it is labeled with certain atomic propositions, while path formulas refer to
sequences of states along which a formula must hold.
1. All atomic propositions are state formulas.
2. If f and g are state formulas, so are ¬f and f ∧ g.
3A DTMC is a sequence of random variables following the Markov property, i.e., the
probability distribution of future states only depends upon the present state [24].
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3. If f and g are state formulas, and t is a nonnegative integer or ∞, then
fU≤tg is a path formula.
4. If f is a path formula and 0 ≤ p ≤ 1, then [f ]>p is a state formula.
The syntax and the logic builds on standard propositional Boolean logic, but
extends with various modes: the key operator is the metric “until” operator:
fU≤tg : here, use of “until” means that one formula f must hold at every
state along the path until a state where the second formula g becomes true,
which must happen in less than or equal to t time units. Finally, we can add
probabilities to these “until”-like path formulas to make state formulas. Path
quantifiers analogous to those in CTL may be defined by: Af ≡ [f ]≥1 [Inevitably
f ]; Ef ≡ [f ]>0 [Possibly f ]; Gf ≡ fU≤∞false[Globally f ], and Ff ≡ trueU≤∞f
[Eventually f ]. Formal semantics of the PCTL formulæ may be found in [28].
One can then say event f “probabilistic causes” g, iff
f 7→≤t≥p g ⇔ AG (f → F≤t≤pg),
for some suitable hyper-parameters p probability and t duration. Additional
criteria (e.g., regularization) are then needed to separate spurious causality from
the genuine ones – as shown below. SBCN, thus, provides a vastly simplified,
and yet practical, approach to causality, especially when explicit time is not
recorded in the data.
The notion of prima facie causality was fruitfully exploited for the task of
modeling cancer evolution in [18, 19, 23], and the SBCNs were finally described
for the first time in [26] but, many of the basic ideas are already implicit in[23].
Definition 3 (Suppes-Bayes Causal Network). Let us consider an input cross-
sectional dataset D of n Bernoulli variables and m samples, the Suppes-Bayes
Causal Network SBCN = (V,E) subsumed by D is a directed acyclic graph
such that the following requirements hold:
[Suppes’ constraints] for each arc (u→ v) ∈ E involving a prima facie relation
between nodes u, v ∈ V , under the mild assumptions that 0 < P (u), P (v) < 1:
P (u) > P (v) and P (v | u) > P (v | ¬u) .
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[Sparsification] let E′ be the set of arcs satisfying the Suppes’ constraints as
before; among all the subsets of E′, the set of arcs E is the one whose correspond-
ing graph maximizes the likelihood of the data and of a certain regularization
function R(f):
E = argmax
E⊆E′,G=(V,E)
(LL(D|G)−R(f)) .
Intuitively, the advantage of SBCNs over general Bayesian networks is the
following. First, with Temporal Priority , SBCN accommodates the time flow
among the nodes. There are obvious cases where some nodes occur before the
other and it is generally natural to state that nodes that happen later cannot
be causes (or parents) of nodes that happen earlier. Second, when learning
general Bayesian networks, arcs A→ B and A← B may sometimes be equally
acceptable, resulting in an undirected arc A−B (this situation is called Markov
Equivalence [16]). For SBCNs, such a situation does not arise because of the
temporal flow being irreversible. Third, because of the two constraints on the
causal links, the SBCN graph is generally more sparse (has fewer edges) than the
graph of general Bayesian networks with the final goal of disentangling spurious
arcs, e.g., due to spurious correlations [29], from genuine causalities.
3.3. Machine Learning and Classification
Even if SBCNs typically yield sparser DAGs than when we use Bayesian
networks, the relations modeled involve both positive and negative financial
scenarios, but only in the latter financial stress may arise. Thus, the extreme
events which are of key relevance for stress testing are still rare in the data
and unlikely to be simulated in naively generated stress scenarios by sampling
from the SBCN directly. Therefore, in this work we improve this basic model
with several key ideas of classic machine learning, namely, feature classification.
Recall that, in stress testing, we wish to target the unlikely, but risky scenarios.
Specifically, when generating random sample from an SBCN to obtain possible
scenarios, each node in the SBCN can take any value in its support according to
its conditional probability table, generating different branches of scenarios. To
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narrow down the search space, we can classify each possible branch as leading
to profitable or lossy scenarios, and if, the branch is classified as profitable, then
random sampling is guided to very likely avoid that branch, thus focusing on
events and causal relations that can be adversarial and risky, though uncommon.
In this way, computation can be reduced significantly to discover the extreme
events (see the next Sections for details).
3.4. An efficient Implementation
The algorithm below, Algorithm 1, encapsulates the earlier discussions.
Algorithm 1 summarizes the inference approach adopted via SBCN. Given
the above inputs, Suppes’ constraints are verified (Lines 3-8) to first construct
a DAG. Then, the likelihood fit is performed by gradient ascent (Lines 9-20),
an iterative optimization technique that starts with an arbitrary solution to
a problem (in our case an empty graph) and then attempts to find a better
solution by incrementally visiting the neighborhood of the current one. If the
new candidate solution is better than the previous one, it is considered in place
of it. The procedure is repeated until the stopping criterion is matched.
In our implementation, the Boolean variable =!StoppingCriterion is satisfied
(Line 11) in two situations: (i) the procedure stops when we have performed a
sufficiently large enough number of iterations or, (ii) it stops when none of the
solutions in Gneighbors is better than the current Gfit, where Gneighbors denotes
all the solutions that are derivable from Gfit by removing or adding at most
one edge.
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Algorithm 1 Learning the SBCN [26]
1: Inputs: D an input dataset of n Bernoulli variables and m samples, and r
a partial order of the variables
2: Output: SBCN(V,E) as in Definition 2
3: [Suppes’ constraints]
4: for all pairs (v, u) among the n Bernoulli variables do
5: if r(v) ≤ r(u) and P (u | v) > P (u | ¬v) then
6: add the arc (v, u) to SBCN .
7: end if
8: end for
9: [Likelihood fit by hill climbing]
10: Consider G(V,E)fit = ∅.
11: while !StoppingCriterion() do
12: Let G(V,E)neighbors be the neighbor solutions of G(V,E)fit.
13: Remove from G(V,E)neighbors any solution whose arcs are not included
in SBCN .
14: Consider a random solution Gcurrent in G(V,E)neighbors.
15: if scoreREG(D,Gcurrent) > scoreREG(D,Gfit) then
16: Gfit = Gcurrent.
17: end if
18: end while
19: SBCN = Gfit.
20: return SBCN .
For more information about the algorithm, also refer to [19, 26].
3.5. Our Contribution
In this section we have shown how we integrated our earlier works on causal-
ity theory to produce an efficient implementation of a financial stress test-
ing framework. However, since the implementation involves several hyper-
parameters and different methods for regularization, the final embodiment re-
quires additional empirical studies, which we describe earlier. For this purpose,
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tested and optimized it rigorously with a carefully selected synthetic financial
model.
4. Results
Next we describe our extensive comparative studies aimed at evaluating the
statistical power of the frameworks that encompass the approaches of Rebonato
(BNs) and ones proposed here (SBCNs) to perform stress testing. The other
manual (expert-driven) approaches are out of the scope of this comparative
studies for obvious reasons.
Thus, the primary engines for stress testing are built with the generative
models, which for our purposes are chosen to be one of of two kinds: Bayes
Net (BN) or Causal Net (SBCN), but expected to behave differently based on
the methods of model regularization: BIC (Bayesian Information Criterion)
or AIC (Akaike Information Criterion) – further constrained with or without
bootstrapping. Thus constructed, the resulting stress testing algorithms may
be investigated for performance, while paying specific attention to the problem
of false discoveries (positive or negative). These results are succinctly visualized
using ROC (Receiver Operating Characteristics). The data used for the analysis
are simulated, as explained later.
We summarize in Figure 2 the results of this analysis by interpolating and
then smoothing out some kinks4 in order to obtain an ROC Space, whose x
axis represent the False Positive Rate and y axis the True Positive Rate. ROC
Space depicts the performance of the different methods we discussed on different
sample sizes. By examining the plot, one can conclude that AICs generally
have high true positive rates but also high false positive rates, as a result of
its less stringent complexity penalty. In contrast, BICs generally have smaller
false positive rates, but its true positive rates are also lower. Comparing the
algorithms with and without bootstrapping, one can notice that the bootstrap
4Because of the data sparsity, the interpolation does not always lead to a smooth monotonic
curves.
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procedure shifts the curves to the left. Still, the best performance lies in the
data with the assumption of sparse relationships. Based on these results, we can
conclude that with Bootstrapping and the assumption of sparse relationships,
our algorithm is capable of recovering accurately the causal relationships in the
data.
Figure 2: Performance in the ROC Space, depicts the trade-offs between false positive rates
and true positive rates. The better results lie in the upper-left corner of the graph where false
positive rate is low and true positive rate is high.
In order to provide further insights into these results, we describe in greater
details: (i) our simulation model that allows us to test the inferred results
against the ground truth, (ii.a) false-discovery analysis, (ii.b) influence of infor-
mation criteria (AIC and BIC) and (ii.c) influence of bootstrapping. Finally, we
describe the effect of Machine Learning in trajectory generation and projection
from SBCN.
4.1. Training Data: Simulation and Evaluation with SBCN
To assess the performance of the algorithm to infer the SBCNs and the
quality of inferred Bayesian networks, a set of training data is developed with
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embedded causal relationships 5. If the algorithms, after ‘learning’ a model from
the training data, are capable of accurately recovering the causal relationships
embedded in them, then comparable accuracy is to be expected on real data. To
simulate the training data, we adopt the stock factor model, the Fama French
Five Factor Model [15], introduced earlier.
To simulate the training data with embedded causal relationship, we linearly
regress historical returns r, onto the five factors, and obtain the distribution of
each factor coefficient and the empirical residual. We notice that a key char-
acterization of an SBCN is an underlying temporal model of the causal relatas
implicit in the network, namely the temporal priority between any pair of factors
(represented by nodes of the SBCN) which are involved in a causal relationship.
Therefore, the five factors described in our generative model are lagged with
respect to the historical returns to comply with the temporal priority. Thus,
ri,t =
∑
i,j
βi,jfj,t−lag + , (4)
where fj,· is the jth factor’s value at a time, properly “lagged.”
Then, the simple training data is simulated by randomly drawing the factor
coefficients βi,j and residuals  from the distribution we obtained from the linear
regression, and apply these coefficients and residuals on a set of new factor
data. Such historical data consists of daily series of five factors and returns of
10 portfolios also constructed by Fama French, and of 10, 000 days. We use the
first 5, 000 for regression and the other 5, 000 for simulation.
In reality, many factors will present causal relationships among themselves.
For example, some factors do not directly influence the asset, but affect the asset
indirectly by its impact on other factors. Therefore, the simulated training data
can be complicated by embedding spurious relationships also among factors.
We linearly regress some factors on the other factors and simulate the training
5The vacuous case of “no causality” was not explored as it is not meaningful in the context
of SBCN; this case was relegated to more general model checking approaches based on PCTL.
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data in the same way. The choice of factors is arbitrary. In this paper, as an
example, we regress the other four factors SML, HML, RMW and CMA on
the market factor Km.
Therefore, the causal relationships which are described in the simulated
training data can be simplified as shown in Figure 3.
Figure 3: Example of causal relationships described in the simulated training data.
Next we show results on 100 independent random simulations generated on
networks of 15 nodes, i.e., 10 stocks and 5 factors with the generative model
discussed in the previous Section. Each node represents a Bernoulli random
variable taking binary values in {0, 1}, where 1 represents the stock or factor
going up and 0, the stock or factor going down. Specifically, the input of our
learning task is a dataset D ∈ {0, 1}n×m, an n × m binary matrix. Starting
with such an input, we attempted to experiment with our learning algorithms
previously described in [19] and [26]. In particular, as in [26], we lacked ex-
plicitly observed time in the data, which are only cross-sectional. To overcome
this problem we gave as a further input to our algorithm a topological rank-
ing r providing information about the temporal priority among the nodes. In
interpreting these experiments, we set ranking as a proxy of time precedence
among the factors influencing the stocks, i.e., in our model factors can cause
stock moves but not the other way around. This strategy results in removal
of implausible spurious arcs going from stocks to factors, but without affecting
any genuine constraints in the arcs among factors or among stocks.
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4.1.1. The Problem of False Discovery
We first tested the performance of Algorithm 1 on a training data of 10
portfolios, 5 factors and 5, 000 observations. On such settings, the algorithm
was capable of recovering almost the whole set of embedded causal relationships
with only 13 false negatives, roughly, 33% of total arcs; however, the number of
false positives were unacceptably larger, reaching around 49% of the total causal
arcs obtained, thus requiring more attention to how the model was regularized.
The explanation for this trend can be found in how the algorithm implements
the regularization via Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) [30], that is:
BIC = k · ln(N)− 2 ln(L),
where k is the number of arcs in the SBCN (i.e. number of causal relationships),
n is the number of observations of the data, and L is the likelihood. The
algorithm searches for the Bayesian network that minimizes the BIC.
For large number of observations, the maximum likelihood optimization en-
sures that asymptotically all the embedded relationships are explored and the
most likely solution is recovered. However, maximum likelihood is known to
be susceptible to over-fitting [16], especially when, as in our case, it deals with
small sample size in the training data. Furthermore, in the training data, all
the portfolios are assumed to depend on the same five factors, although with
different coefficients, but very likely some portfolios will have very similar co-
efficients, resulting in co-movements across the portfolios. This co-movement
will often induce correlations that affect the probability raising and thus the
spurious prima facie causal relations, making these settings an interesting, and
yet a very hard test case. See Figure 4.
4.1.2. Sample Size and Information Criterion
To reduce the spurious causalities, we recall some intrinsic properties of the
information criteria. The Bayesian Information Criterion BIC = k · ln(N) −
2 ln(L), not only maximizes the likelihood, but also penalizes the complexity
of the model by the term k · ln(N). For small sample sizes, BIC is generally
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Figure 4: The figure simplifies the true causal relationships (on the left), and the spurious
relationships (on the right) emerging from the simulated data.
biased towards simple models because of the penalty. However, for large sample
size, BIC is willing to accept complex models. For additional discussion, see the
details in [16].
In our simulations we adopted a sample size of 5, 000 which is considerably
large relative to the degree of freedom of the score function, thus inducing BIC
to infer a relatively complex model with a number of unnecessary spurious arcs.
Counter-intuitively, we could improve the solutions by using smaller sized data
and letting the complexity penalty take a bigger effects in BIC score. This
strategy also addresses the non-stationarity in the data, an endemic problem
for financial data. Following this intuition, we performed further experiments
by reducing the original sample size of 5, 000 samples, which describes around 10
years of data, in turn to 250 and 500, and we observed a significant reduction
in the number of false positives, to 38% and 40% of total arcs respectively.
However, at the same time, because of smaller sample size, the number of false
negatives inevitably increased to more than 50% of total arcs.
To reconcile this dilemma, we next considered an alternative information
criterion, the AIC, Akaike Information Criterion [31], defined as in the following:
AIC = 2k − ln(L).
We notice that for AIC, the coefficient of k is set to 2, leading to definitely
smaller factor than ln(N) of BIC when the sample size N is large. For this
reason, AIC supports the trend of accepting more complex models for given
sample sizes than BIC. Applying AIC, the number of false negatives typically
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decreases, while the number of false positive gets larger.
4.1.3. Improving Model Selection by Bootstrapping
So far we have described the different characteristics of two state-of-the-
art likelihood scores while aiming to minimize the number of resulting false
positive and false negative arcs in the inferred model. Specifically, we showed a
trade-off where, because of their characteristics, the best results on large sample
sizes is obtained using BIC, while for small sample sizes AIC is more effective,
but neither of the two regularization schemes display a satisfactory trend. To
improve their performance, we then examined a bootstrap [32] procedure for
model selection.
The idea of bootstrap is the following: we first learn the structure and
parameters of the SBCN as before, but we perform subsequently a re-sampling
procedure where we sample with repetitions data from the dataset in order to
generate a set of bootstrapped datasets, e.g., 100 times, and then we calculate
the relative confidence level of each arc in the originally inferred SBCN, by
performing the inference from each of the bootstrapped dataset and counting
how many times a given arc is retrieved. In this way, we obtained a confidence
level for any arc in the SBCN.
We once again tested such an approach on our simulations and we observed
empirically that the confidence level of spurious arcs are typically smaller than
the confidence level for true causal relations. Therefore, a simple method of
pruning the inferred SBCN to constrain for a given minimum confidence level is
here applied. Such a threshold reflects the number of false positives that we are
willing to include in the model, with higher thresholds ensuring sparser models.
Here, we test our approach by requiring a minimum confidence level of 0.5, i.e.,
any valid arc must be retrieved at least half of the times.
We now conclude our analysis by showing in Tables 2 and 3 the contingency
tables resulting from our experiments both for Algorithm 1 (Table 3) and for
the standard likelihood fit method to infer Bayesian Networks (Table 2):
Table 3 presents the results in terms of false positives (FP) and false nega-
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BIC BICBoot AIC AICBoot
Sample FP FN FP FN FP FN FP FN
250 50.4 94.9 31.9 95.3 57.0 89.5 39.3 95.2
500 51.8 94.7 45.6 96.6 61.6 93.5 51.5 98.7
1000 55.2 93.5 47.6 94.5 63.7 85.5 50.4 95.2
2500 60.3 90.3 54.8 99.9 68.4 85.7 62.4 99.8
3500 62.5 84.2 58.0 94.3 69.5 85.7 63.7 96.8
5000 66.6 80.9 65.6 85.7 71.8 85.7 70.7 85.7
Table 2: Contingency Table of the Performances by standard Bayesian Networks of Different
Information Criteria and Sample Sizes.
BIC BICBoot AIC AICBoot
Sample FP FN FP FN FP FN FP FN
250 37.6 67.7 24.7 83.3 42.8 40.1 27.9 51.5
500 39.6 52.3 36.8 55.9 43.7 38.5 40.9 39.0
1000 43.1 39.1 40.7 47.8 47.9 37.6 43.9 38.0
2500 52.2 50.8 45.1 50.8 57.1 28.5 50.2 38.6
3500 48.7 33.3 48.7 33.3 58.8 28.5 57.1 28.5
5000 48.7 33.3 47.5 33.3 57.1 14.3 53.8 19.9
Table 3: Contingency Table of the Performances by Algorithm 1 of Different Information
Criteria and Sample Sizes.
tives (FN) by Algorithm 1 with the various methods on the training data with
different information criteria, sample sizes, and whether Bootstrapping is ap-
plied. The trade-off between false positive rates and false negative rates usually
is case-specific. We observe that, in general, the objective of such an approach
is to correctly and precisely recover the true distribution underlying the training
data. For this reason, unless differently specified for specific uses, there is not
an overall preference toward either lower false positive or lower false negative.
Therefore, we evaluate our methods by considering the sum of both false pos-
itive and false negative rates. This metric is biased toward a combination of
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relatively low FP and FN rather than the combination of very low FP and high
FN and so on. By analyzing the results shown in Table 3, we can clearly observe
a trend where AIC with Bootstrapping on small sample datasets (i.e., 250) and
BIC with Bootstrapping on large sample datasets (i.e., 5, 000) produces the best
results, which is in agreement with the discussion of the previous Section. Also,
we observe that both for AIC without any bootstrapping on sample sizes of 250
and BIC without any bootstrapping on sample size of 5, 000, the false positive
rates are reduced without a significant increase in the false negative rates.
We conclude by pointing out the significant increase in performance (both
in terms of FP and FN) when using SBCNs in place of standard BNs (compare
Tables 2 and 3).
4.1.4. Assumption of Sparse Relationships
The resulting false positive rate may still seem relatively high. But, one
important assumption is worth mentioning. In the training data, such high
false positive rate derives from the fact that portfolios are dependent on the
5 common factors, which very likely will induce co-movements. However, in
the real data, such nested dependencies do not always occur, while a feature of
sparse relationships appears frequently, and portfolios depend on distinctively
small sets of factors. This assumption of sparsity can significantly improve the
performance of the algorithm.
To implement the assumption of sparsity, we deviate from the original Fama
French five factor model. For simplicity, we generate data with sparse rela-
tionships using a random linear model with 10 factor variables and 20 stock
variables. With 30% probability, each stock variable is dependent linearly on
one of the 10 factor variables, so on average, each stock variable will be de-
pendent on 3 factor variables, which will likely be distinct from the dependent
factor variables of other stock variables. Then we sample factor variable data
from a normal distribution and compute the corresponding stock data using the
linear model.
Implementing this sparsity on a new set of purely random training data we
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obtain with Algorithm 1 much better results, and, e.g., following the BIC with
Bootstrapping method mentioned above, we obtain on small sample size (250
samples) 18.1% false positive and 39.2% false negative rates, while on large
sample size (2, 500 samples), we obtain 50.2% false positive and 38.6% false
negative rates.
4.2. Practical Stress Testing
In this Section we present how to assess stress testing scenarios given the in-
ferred Suppes-Bayes Causal Network and we present the results on the simulated
data.
4.2.1. Risk Management by Simulations
After the inference of the SBCN, we perform Monte Carlo Simulation in the
same way as conventional risk management, by drawing large number of sam-
ples to discover the worst 5% scenarios as the value at risk (VaR). Nevertheless,
here in stress testing, we are targeting the most extreme events, which have very
low but nonzero probability of occurrence. Thus, they still can occur, for exam-
ple, the 2008 financial crisis or the most recent market reactions to BREXIT.
Therefore, when drawing samples from the network, we would like to reject the
normal scenarios, and place more importance on the extreme events. To achieve
this goal, when conducting random sampling, we classify each possible branch
as profitable or risky, and if the branch is classified as profitable, then we will
avoid that branch.
Figure 5 represents a simple binary classification where for this factor only
Factor.i with value 0 is considered risky and, hence, this scenario is the only
one to be sampled. In this way, we target the extremely risky events and reduce
computation. But, unlike conventional risk management, this approach does
not allow us to estimate the probability of occurrence of the sampled extreme
events, therefore we will not conclude a value at risk with certain confidence
level.
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Figure 5: Risk classification in our SBCN.
The simple binary classification with certain features is a standard machine
learning problem. Here we explore a simple solution of such a task based on
decision trees [33]. A decision tree is a predictive models that maps features
of an object to a target value of the object. Here, the features are the factors
of interest, and the target value is whether the portfolio is prone to profit or
loss. To perform classification, we first draw 1, 000 sample trajectories from the
inferred SBCN. Then we construct a simple portfolio, which is long on all the
stocks in the SBCN by the same amount, and calculate the Profit and Loss (P/L)
of each observation. Here however, because the underlying SBCN depicts binary
variables, exact Profit and Loss (P/L) statistics cannot be obtained. Instead,
since the toy portfolio is long on all stocks by the same amount, the ratio of
stocks that goes up is an approximate measure of risk. Of course, for continuous
Bayesian network, Profit and Loss can be calculated directly. In the next step,
we sort this measure, and denote the bottom-most 100 scenarios as risky, and
the rest as profitable. The 100 ‘risky’ scenarios contain at least 7 stocks that fall.
Then we consider 1, 000 samples each of them labeled as ‘risky’ or ‘profitable.’
In our experiments, we used the R ‘tree’ package [34].
Using the SBCN learned from the simulated training data, we obtain the
following decision tree shown in Figure 6.
30
Figure 6: Decision tree obtained from the SBCN.
In the decision tree of Figure 6, S denotes factor SMB; M denotes Market
Km; H denotes HML; R denotes RMW and C denotes CMA. Here we show
only the left part of the entire computed decision tree, the subtree with S = 1
is omitted, since the entire subtree with S = 1 is classified as ‘Profitable,’ which
is not of interest for stress testing. In the tree, we identify two paths that are
classified as ‘Risky.’ Path S = 0, M = 0, H = 0, R = 0, C = 0 and Path
S = 0,M = 0, H = 0, R = 0, C = 1. The paths classified are intuitive, since our
example portfolio is long with equal amount invested over all 10 stocks. Since
10 stocks are generally positively dependent on the factors, most factors with
0 values will likely induce a ‘Risky’ path. For more complicated portfolios and
real factors, such intuition cannot be easily found so we have to rely on the
result of classification.
4.2.2. Scenario Generation and Results
Given the tree of Figure 6, we then used the bnlearn R package [35] to
sample from the SBCN. Given the network, we can simulate random scenarios,
however, we wish not to simulate all of them, which will prove to be inefficient,
but following the informations provided by the classification tree we choose
the configurations which are likely to indicate risk to drive our sampling. For
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instance, we may pick the first path in the tree, which is S = 0, M = 0, H = 0,
R = 0, C = 0, and constrain the distribution induced by the SBCN. In order
to avoid sampling the scenarios which are not in accordance with the path, we
adjust the conditional probability table of the SBCN. Since we want paths with
all five factors taking value 0, we set the conditional probability of these five
factors taking value 1 to 0, and the conditional probability of factors taking
value 0 to 1. In this way, the undesirable paths will be unlikely to be simulated,
while the intrinsic distribution of how factors affect the stocks is still modeled.
More sophisticated implementation based on this intuition are possible: e.g.,
using branch-and-bound, policy valuation, tree-search, etc, but we will leave
this to future research.
Comparing the results of the simulations using the original SBCN and the
one taking into account the decision tree, we show the distribution of the risk
measure, the number of stocks that go up in the Figure 7.
Figure 7: Distribution of Number of Stocks Going Up.
The number of stocks going up from 100 samples generated by the origi-
nal SBCN is roughly evenly distributed. At the same time, the 100 samples
generated by the modified SBCN contain no scenarios with more than 5 stocks
going up, and 84 out of the 100 samples have at most 1 stock going up. We can
clearly see that the modified SBCN places far more importance on the stressed
scenarios, and in turn confirms the result of the classification algorithm by the
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decision tree. In this way, computational complexity involved in generating
stressed scenarios can be improved tremendously. This kind of computational
efficiency issues will be more critical when we move from a simple Bernoulli
random variable to multi-categorical variables or continuous random variable.
Therefore, with the same computing power, the modified SBCN makes it pos-
sible to generate more stressed scenarios, and observe how portfolios or other
assets respond to stressed factors.
5. Conclusion
In summary, in this paper we develop a novel framework to perform stress
testing combining Suppes-Bayes Causal Networks and machine learning classi-
fication. We learn SBCNs from data using Algorithm 1 and assess the quality
of the learned model by switching information criteria based upon sample sizes
and bootstrapping. We then simulate stress scenarios using SBCNs, but reduce
computation by classifying each branch of nodes in the network as ‘profitable’
or ‘risky’ using classification trees. For simplicity, the paper implements SBCNs
with Bernoulli variables and simulates data using Fama French’s Five Factor
Model, but the logic of the problem is easily extended to deal with more prac-
tical situations. First of all, the SBCNs can accommodate more complicated
variables (nodes). In addition to the factor based portfolios considered here,
other factor models, or directly other financial and economic factors like foreign
exchange rates, can also be included, and the accuracy of the model can ensure
that the true causal relationships among the factors are discovered. In practice,
variables like stock prices are continuous, thus, one can easily extend to these
situations by adopting a hybrid SBCN, where the variables can take either dis-
crete or continuous values, making it possible to represent precisely the values
of the variables we are interested in.
To use the model, the role of experts is still important. After learning
the SBCN from data and applying classification, we can identify a number of
stressed scenarios. However, we expect that some of these to be unacceptable
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for various unforeseen reasons, e.g., as those known to domain experts. These
scenarios may be thought of as highly stressed with respect to the corresponding
portfolio but they could prove to be less useful in practice. Therefore, experts
can select from the identified stressed scenarios only the plausible ones, and
discard the ones deemed to be flawed. Even in this case, we can perform sim-
ulations following the selected stressed trajectories in the SBCN and observe
the reactions of the portfolios in these stressed scenarios of interest, and thus
adjust the portfolios based on the reactions. Another direct usage of our ap-
proach is when experts have a particular candidate stress scenario in mind,
which can be justified a priori; in this case one can skip the process of classifica-
tion and directly adjust the SBCN mutatis mutandis. Therefore, simulations of
the adjusted SBCN will also offer the reactions of the portfolio to this particular
stressed scenario.
We believe, based on our empirical analysis, that we have devised an ef-
ficient automated stress testing method using machine learning and causality
analysis in order to solve a critical regulatory problem, as demonstrated by the
algorithm’s ability to recover the causal relationships in the data, as well as its
efficiency, in terms of computation and data usage. We plan to test our algo-
rithms on real data to compare against human experts in a commercial setting,
and based on our promising results with the simulated data, we are confident
that the resulting platform will find a significant fraction (if not all) of the
adversarial scenarios.
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